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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JAMES LEE MORENO, 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 950213-CA 
Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, entered on the 
23rd day of December, 1992. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-2 (2) (f) (1953 as amended). 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. May a search of a vehicle take place without a 
search warrant upon the arrest of the driver for an 
unrelated misdemeanor in the absence of probable 
cause or exigent circumstances where the driver is 
arrested outside his locked vehicle? 
2. Are the findings of the trial court allowing 
the search of the defendant's vehicle supported by the 
record? 
3. Should the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law have been signed over the objections of defendant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for suppression issues is 
that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 215 (Utah App 1991). 
The standard of review for conclusions of law is 
a correction of error standard. State v. Steward, supra. 
TABLE OF CASES 
and 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVEE 
1. State v^ Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 
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State vis. Hyah , 711 P. 2d 272 (Utah 1984) 
State \LL. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) 
United States }u Walker, No. 90-CR-13 (Utah 1990) 
State v^ . Sims. 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 1991) 
State JL Stricklina. 844 P.2d 979 (Utah App 1992) 
U.S. L. Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir 1993) 
U.S. v^ Anqula-Fernandez, 1995 WL 257255(10th Cir) 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreas onable searches and seizures,shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
United States Constitution , Fifth Amendment states: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capitol, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces 
, or in the Militia, when in actual service 
in time of War or in public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall 
be compel led in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation . 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the 
Utah states: , 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses , papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated and no warran t shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirm ation# partic ularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd of October, 1991, the defendant followed 
a police decoy from State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to the parking lot near the pool area of a motel in Salt 
Lake City. (Tr. 5,9) At that time the defendant parked, 
exited and locked his vehicle. (Tr. 5, 10) The vehicle was 
properly parked in the parking lot of the motel and was not 
blocking traffic. (Tr. 7) 
As the defendant was walking away from his parked and 
locked vehicle, a detective with the Salt Lake City Police 
walked up and told him he was under arrest for solicitation 
of sex acts, handcuffed the defendant and took him back to 
his car. (Tr. 10) The defendant was then removed from the 
area. (Tr. 10) 
Officer Jackson of the Salt Lake City Police then 
walked back to the defendant's vehicle, looked inside it 
and saw on the passenger side a folded bindle. (Tr. 11) 
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The officers then took the keys from the top of the 
defendant's vehicle and took the folded paper and 
unfolded it and field tested the powder inside, which 
tested positive for the presence of cocaine. (Tr. 11) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October of 1991 the defendant was charged with 
solicitation of sex acts and possession of a controlled 
substance. The defendant waived his preliminary hearing 
and filed a Motion to Suppress based on constitutional 
grounds in the District Court of Salt Lake County, and 
on March 20, 1992, said Court, Honorable James S. Sawaya 
presiding, heard said Motion to Suppress and denied the 
same on April 7, 1992. 
The defendant filed a motion to remand the case back 
to the Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, on the 27th day 
of July, 1992, for a preliminary hearing based on alleged 
failure of a member of the Salt Lake County attorney's 
office to fulfill the terms of an alleged plea bargain. 
The trial judge ordered an evidentiary hearing and requested 
James Cope and John Bucher to attend, but on July 31, 1992, 
refused to hear evidence and denied defendant's motion. 
The defendant pled guilty conditionally to Possession 
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of a Controlled Substance on November 23, 1992, and the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya stayed the execution of the 
sentence of defendant on December 29, 1992, to allow 
the appeal of the denial of the Motion to Suppress. The 
Court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause staying the 
sentence and accepting the conditional appeal. (R. at 60) 
The Utah Court of Appeals, on the 12th of July, 1994, 
issued a Memorandum Decision remanding the case back 
to the trial court for issuance of specific findings of 
fact and conclusions of law on why the court denied the 
defendants Motion to Suppress. (R. at 93). The trial court 
issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 
22, 1995, over the objections of the defendant filed January 
18, 1995. (R. at 97-100). The defendant filed his Notice of 
Appeal on March 24, 1995. (R. at 103). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. MAY A SEARCH OF A VEHICLE TAKE PLACE WITHOUT A 
SEARCH WARRANT UPON THE ARREST OF THE DRIVER FOR AN UNRELATED 
MISDEMEANOR IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE OR EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE DRIVER IS ARRESTED OUTSIDE THE LOCKED 
VEHICLE? 
The appellant maintains that the search of his vehicle 
and the concomitant seizure should not have taken place 
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without a search warrant because there were no exigent 
circumstances nor was there probable cause. 
There was no probable cause because the sight of a 
folded paper in a car is not indicative of anything which 
would justify a warrantless entry, nor are there exigent 
circumstances because the defendant was outside his parked 
and locked vehicle and he was under arrest for solicitation. 
2. ARE THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ALLOWING THE 
SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD? 
The trial court, in a effort to comply with the mandate 
of the Court of Appeal's directive that specific findings be 
made, merely recited all the possible findings suggested by 
the Court of Appeals as examples and no effort was made to 
tie the findings to the record. 
3. SHOULD THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW HAVE BEEN SIGNED OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENDANT? 
When the new Findings and Conclusions were sent to 
the defendant's counsel, he timely objected that they do 
not accurately reflect the record, however the Findings and 
Conclusions were signed a short time thereafter without any 
hearing or ruling on the objections. 
ARGUMENT 
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1. MAY A SEARCH OF A VEHICLE TAKE PLACE WITHOUT A SEARCH 
WARRANT UPON A STOP AND ARREST OF THE DRIVER FOR UNRELATED 
TRAFFIC BENCH WARRANT IN THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE OR 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES? 
A. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION 
There seems little doubt that a conditional plea is a 
proper procedure for the discussion of a denial of a Motion 
to Suppress. State v. Seary. 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. 1988). 
In a like manner, there seems to be little doubt that 
the appellant need not argue his standing before an Appeals 
Court when his lack of standing has not been questioned and 
where the record indicates that the appellant was the owner 
and the driver of the vehicle in question State v. 
Constantino. 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987). 
B. PRIMARY DISCUSSION 
Appellant contends that the combined exigency and 
probable cause requirements of State v_a_ Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 470 (Utah 1990), and State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 
App.1991), as cited with approval in State JL ffajgbjtt, 827 
P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992), have been violated in that the 
defendant was outside his lawfully parked vehicle, in a 
parking area of a motel, his vehicle was locked and he was 
being arrested for a crime (sex act solicitation) which had 
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nothing to do with the status of the vehicle. The officer 
looked in the window and saw a paper which he called a 
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 bindle" and claims that it is the kind of magazine fold in 
which drugs have been contained (Tr. 13, 14). The officer 
could not give a number on the times he knows that tested 
drugs were so contained, but that a lot were wrapped that 
way. (Tr. 14, Lines 1 to 14). 
(Neither the officer nor any other witness brought the 
magazine paper to court for the suppression hearing or any 
other hearing (Tr. 12), and appellant contends that this 
alone, in the circumstances of this case, deny the State 
from claiming they have met their burden.) 
In Larocco. supra, the Court stated: 
The time has come for what this court, in applying 
an automobile exception to the warrant requirement of 
article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to try 
to simplify, if possible, the search and seizure rules 
so that they can be more easily followed by the police 
and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public 
with consistent and predictable protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. This can be 
accomplishe d by eliminating some of the confusing 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that have been 
developed by federal law in recent years. See id. 
Specif icall y, this court will continue to use the 
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable 
threshold criterion for determining whether article I, 
section 14 applies, warrantless searches will be 
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety of police 
or the public or to prevent the destruction of evidence. 
See id; also, Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752, 762-
63 (1969) 
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As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh, supra: 
Once the threat that the suspect will 
injure the officers with concealed weapons 
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is 
no persuasive reason why the officers 
cannot take the time to secure a warrant. 
Such a requirement would present little 
impediment to police investigations, 
especially in light of the ease in 
which warrants can be obtained under Utah's 
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, 
7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.) 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272; see State v. Lopez. 
676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984). 
The appellant contends that there were no exigent 
circumstances to avoid the search warrant requirement. That 
is, the automobile was not en route outside the officer's 
jurisdiction nor anywhere else and there was no reason, as 
is claimed by the Findings, to believe the vehicle to be 
in any more or different danger than any other vehicle. 
In any case, the automobile was parked and locked and 
the defendant was on his way to jail. Even if this Court 
does not interpret Larocco. supra, to require a search 
warrant in the circumstances of this case, traditional 
Fourth Amendment analysis or state constitutional analysis 
does not permit the conclusion that the search and seizure 
was permissible. 
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IL_ S^ J L Nielsen. 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) has 
announced that probable cause exists and a warrantless search 
of an automobile is permitted if a "totality of the 
circumstances" indicate there is a "fair probability" that 
the car contains contraband. The circumstances in this case 
are that an officer looked through a window of the 
defendant's car and saw a magazine page folded in a way that 
he has seen other paper folded which later turned out to have 
drugs inside. There were no drugs present in the car whether 
seen or unseen by the officer, there were no drugs on the 
defendant, there were no passengers, there was no reason to 
assume that the magazine paper had drugs inside at all except 
for the officer's experience in the past as to the way it was 
folded. The officer neglected to take the magazine paper to 
the hearing, so the judge could make no finding as to how it 
appeared, but he described it as a folded magazine paper 
maybe an inch and one-half square. (Tr. 12), and that he 
did not know of the number of folded papers like that he had 
seen which later was established contained a controlled 
substance (Tr. 14), except that there were a lot (Tr. 14). 
With that kind of foundation, an intrusion into all cars in 
every parking lot could be justified, if they contained a 
folded magazine page or other paper which at least some 
officer in the department could say they had seen drugs 
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wrapped in"lots of times". 
It becomes unclear on pages 11 and 12 of the Transcript, 
what led the officer to believe the package was cocaine, 
whether it was the fold or the fact it was a magazine, but a 
fair paraphrase would be that it was the fold. Unless some 
other factor is present which would lead one to believe the 
magazine contained a controlled substance, how is it that 
a search of an automobile may take place upon the experience 
of officers when they are not able to lay any better 
foundation than an officer for two years who has seen a lot 
of papers folded the way of this case. (Tr. 13). Again, 
there are no other relevant circumstances, the sight of the 
paper alone is the justification used for the search and the 
appellant contends that this justification is simply too 
casual and skimpy to permit intrusions into the privacy 
of automobiles which are typically full of paper of all 
sorts. 
The appellant urges that even if this Court does not 
conclude that Larocco. supra, does not interpret the state 
constitutional provisions in such a way as to require a 
warrant, that the Court should rule that the State did not 
meet its burden at the trial court level to show that a 
warrantless search was lawful. State v^ Christensen. 676 
P.2d 408 Utah 1984), in that the suspected package was not 
produced nor was there sufficient foundation for the 
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The appellant urges that Larocco#s, supra, purpose to 
simplify automobile search and seizure law by. requiring a 
sear 3 
cause and exigent circumstances, and that such searches are 
per se unreasonable without the exigent circumstances that 
t l i i e I  1 mi 1 II ( 1 ii mi II ill II Il 11 I Late v . Romero
 r 1 11 1 11! " II 5 
(Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
As in Larocco. supra, the officers 1 *•*« ^ ase bar could 
indication that the car would not be available for such a 
search at the place where it was parked. 
II. ARE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT ALLOWING 
THE SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD? 
Following the hearing held March 20, 1992 on Mr. Moreno's 
Motion to Suppress Evidence, the District Court entered four 
Findings of Fact. Upon review, the Utah Court of Appeals may 
reject these findings if upon the record they are clearly 
erroneous. A review of the hearing transcript reveals that the 
court did not make findings consistent with the evidence put 
forth at the hearing nor drew the proper conclusions from the 
findings it made. 
In its Finding No. 1, the court states that Mr. Moreno 
"jumped from his car and quickly locked it" after parking in the 
Colonial Hotel parking lot. Nowhere in the transcript of the 
hearing are Mr. Moreno's actions characterized in this 
prejudicial manner. Officer Jackson stated that Mr. Moreno 
simply "got out, locked his door, stood there . . . " (Tr. at p. 
10, 11. 8-9) Officer Harris told the court that "Mr. Moreno 
exited the vehicle" but says nothing about the manner in which 
Mr. Moreno locked his vehicle. (Tr. at p. 15, 1. 16) Nor did 
Mr. Moreno himself state that he "jumped" out of his car and 
"quickly" locked it. (Tr. at p. 5) The only place in the 
transcript where Mr. Moreno's actions are characterized in such a 
manner is during the argument by County Attorney Thomas P. Vuyk 
found on page 20 in which he says, "This is the entire process 
the officers had reason to be suspicious when he jumped out of 
the car and locked it." (Emphasis added.) 
Despite the well established rule that an attorney's 
argument is not evidence and cannot be used as the basis for a 
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court's findings of fact, obvious that the district court 
improperly relied iirgumem 1. 
Not only did i1: borrow ** State's language but xpandeu . <: by 
adding the word "quick] % r \~^ if this particular language 
was pivotal -_. argument 2 
to search Mr. Moreno's vehicle ~ andows Mr. Moreno's actions 
with a furtiveness that the evidence at hearing, rresting 
officers' own testimony, does i I :: • t: suppoi 
have inferred from the testimony that Mr. Moreno's actions were 
i , |, rirT, fJfl <| because there is no evidence from any * the three 
witnesses that Mr. Moreno was aware 
officers' presence prior to h Is exit from and the locking of hi s 
indina No. 1 is clearly erroneous and must be 
rejected. 
The court also erred ,; it s Finding of Fact Nos. ~ ~ ~ by 
hhe arresting officers asked Mr. 
Moreno if they could search >> car prior to placing 
patrol vehicle. (Tr. at This timing is important because 
-formed desire the officers to search Mr 
Moreno's vehicle regardless the warrant requirement. It was 
only after Mr. Moreno had refused and been placed in a police 
vehir I I II I ! 1" in ci Jackson looked into the vehicle and saw the 
alleged bindle. Having already arrested " ' M ;.  i vi 
solicitation iic reason existed for Officer Jackson look into 
:he result *• true Terry stop. 
The vehicle had no relation the crime with which Mr Moreno 
had been charged. 
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In addition, Mr. Moreno testified that the officers asked 
him a second time whether they could search his car to which he 
replied no. (Tr. at p. 6, 11. 19-21) The officers then stated 
that they had "a right to go in there" even though they had not 
obtained a warrant to do so. (Tr. at p. 7) This important fact 
was not disputed at the hearing yet was nowhere mentioned by the 
district court. It further confirms the police's intent to 
search the vehicle regardless of consent or warrant. 
Mr. Moreno also objects to the court's finding that Officer 
Jackson observed a lfbindle of cocaine.11 At numerous points in 
the hearing the officers referred to the object removed from Mr. 
Moreno's car as a folded paper or a piece of magazine which was 
not clear. (Tr. at pp. 11, 12 & 17-18) The testimony of Officer 
Jackson reveals that he could not see what substance, if any, was 
inside the folder piece of paper. (Tr. at p. 12, 11. 18-19) 
Only after seizing the paper, opening it, and testing the 
contents did he ascertain that it allegedly contained cocaine. 
At no time did Officer Jackson indicate that he saw cocaine or 
other contraband in Mr. Moreno's vehicle. Therefore, the 
district court's finding that he observed a "bindle of cocaine" 
is clearly erroneous and must be set aside. 
Mr. Moreno asserts that the district court's findings are so 
erroneous as to require the reversal of the district court's 
conviction. However, even assuming the court's findings are 
correct, they do not support the conclusions of law it makes. 
Conclusions of law may be overturned under the "correction of 
error" standard of review. 
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Till Il in i 1 ndes that the alleged contraband was *; i * in 
view in Mr. Moreno's vehic. "" ' ' >" i" 
specify that only a bindle ^ folded paper that was opaque) was 
i * ^ -- not find that the officers 
could see cocaine i i i i i i i i i i i t i nil > mi 
folded paper has not been construed as an illegal substance or 
the officers said was that they 
saw a piece of folded paper which they
 C Oncludeo 
cocaine. The experience of the officers with this type 
fficer Jackson could not specify 
even estimate how many times he #d found a conl fuJ I<HJ ,il n 
this kind of folded paper (Tr. _ "" zhe only 
experience with a so-called bindle 
was that he'd "run into them several times" d u u m i 111". - i in h. 
(Tr. at p li I 22-23) There is absolutely no evidence of how 
long cement officer * opportunity 
he's had to observe this type of bindle. The __.,. ma ( 
findings as to the experience qualifications of the officers 
Another error the court makes i: characterizing 
paper seized as contraband. Such characterization assumes that a 
c o l i/La ii i'fii hit" rr thhini I !i , i illegal substance that may 
be i n the container. This is 
example, a backpack in an automobile is often a place where 
marijuana State to I h n t-ec-t-
 f 
however, to argue that the warrantless search and seizure I i 
backpack observed on the front passenger seat of a parked, locked 
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car# without more, is constitutional. Even under the district 
court's findings, the conclusion that contraband was in plain 
view is erroneous and must be overturned. 
The court also concluded that the search was necessary due 
to exigent circumstances. In its Conclusion of Law No. 4, the 
court held that the alleged contraband could have been stolen or 
destroyed by passers-by if not seized immediately. The Findings 
of Fact, however, do not reveal any circumstances of the arrest 
that indicate this was a danger. There is no testimony from the 
officers that they were concerned with third parties taking or 
destroying the evidence. The car was locked. And although the 
court states that the bindle was "obvious contraband", it did not 
set forth any findings that would support this conclusion. It 
did not because it could not given the evidence on the record. 
The bindle was not even introduced into evidence at the hearing. 
(Tr. at p. 12) 
The court appears concerned that if the police had given Mr. 
Moreno a mere citation rather than arresting him, he could have 
driven away before the police could obtain a warrant. 
Theoretically this may be true. However, if the officers felt 
that they had enough suspicion to apply for a warrant could they 
not simply arrest the defendant and take him into custody, as 
they did here, thus preventing him from driving off? Wouldn't it 
defy logic to write a citation under these particular 
circumstances if the option of custodial arrest existed? The 
answers to these questions is a resounding "yes." There were two 
officers involved in the arrest. One could have stayed behind 
18 
\ "nfl,"- ' vehicle while the other applied for the warrant. 
A telephonic warrant was «. so ava„ ., 
vehicle was parked, locked, and >:<i parking was 
) 'ocked, parked 11 the stree4 danger of being driven 
away by a passenger or the defendant 
conclusion that exigent circumstances existed is not based upon 
"indings and is therefore in error. The only way 
to correct such error is to overturn the 
prohibit the State from introducing the bindle at trial. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant maintains that the State has not 
met the burden to show this search was constitutional 
without a warrant because there was no probable cause 
and no exigent circumstance exist 
DATED THIS day of 19 4i. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
DELIVERY/CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing was delivered to the following on the 
May of June, 1995. 
J. Frederick Voros 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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APPENDIX 
l\ 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
JAMES M. COPE, 0726 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
Plaintiff, ) LAW AND ORDER 
-vs-
) CaseNo.911901754FS 
JAMES LEE MORENO, 
' Judge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on regularly for hearing on March 
20, 1992. The Court heard testimony from the defendant, James Moreno, and from police 
officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris. The Court also heard argument from defendant's 
counsel and the State's counsel. Based upon the foregoing, the Court now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On 23 October 1991, the defendant approached a woman on Main Street near 
1400 South. The woman was working with officers Harvey Jackson and David Harris in an 
effort to suppress prostitution activities in the area, but the defendant did not know this. He 
offered the woman $35.00 to "party" with him. The decoy agreed and told defendant to follow 
her to the Colonial Hotel parking lot. As soon as defendant stopped in the lot, his vehicle was 
sandwiched by two police cars. The defendant jumped from his car and quickly locked it. He 
was then placed under arrest for solicitation of prostitution. 
22 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
CaseNo.911901754FS 
Page 2 
2. Officer Harris, who arrested the defendant, handcui 
to his arrest. The contents of defendant's pockets were placed on the roof of defendant's vehicle. 
Defendant rs where Harris began writing a citation for the 
solicitation charge. 
3. rnc i »*- ;r Jackson looked through the window of 
defendant's vehic - led him to believe was a "'bindle of 
cocaine" on the passenger front seat. He pointed this bindle out to Officer Harris, then took 
defendant's keys from the roof of the car, unlocked the vehicle, and removed the bindle. 
White powde. cocaine, 
defendant admitted to police officers that the bindle contained cocaine and belonged to him. 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Although a warrantless search such as the one here is presumed to be illegal, Utah 
I i vu i, > 11L'Co 111.11 i i i 111111111111111 i i). i \ i r searched if there is both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances. State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190. 5 (Utah App. 
2, Probable cause to open the defendant's locked vehicle was established as soon as 
[In diuy c\\j\ nun i.illl Illln i i iihstTvnl Hi • liiiiiiirilii III niini < iirw on the front seat. No search had 
taken place before this observation of the contraband. The police were certainly entitle^ 
whatever a member of the public could see from that same vantage point. State v. Leey 633 P.2d 
A 
Officer Jackson's seizure of the bindle necessitated his entry, into the defendants 
into the car without a warrant was justified by exigent circumstances. 
The exigent circumstances in this < 
destruction of evidence which the easily-seen bindle presented for anyone looking into 
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defendant's car. This parking lot was open to the public, including prostitutes and their Johns. If 
the defendant were to receive only a citation, he could drive his vehicle away before police could 
obtain a warrant to seize the bindle. If the defendant were to be booked, the police would be 
remiss to allow such obvious contraband to be left in open view in a public place while the 
vehicle's driver was taken to the jail. 
5. Officer Jackson's warrantless entry into the vehicle to seize the bindle complied 
with all constitutional strictures. 
BASED UPON the foregoing, the Court enters the following: 
ORDER 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence in this matter shall be and hereby is DENIED. 
DATED this / / ~~day of February, 1995. 
BY THE COURTS \ 
\ / 
JAMES S. SAWAYA, Judge' 
Approved as to form: 
JOHN R. BUCHER 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CKRTTFTCATE OF SERVICE 
the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was mailed to John R. Bucher, Attorney for Defendant James 
Lee Moreno, at 1343 South 1100 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 on the £% day of February, 
1995. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State Of Utah, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) (Not For Publication) 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ) 
v
* ) Case No. 930009-CA 
Jamie Lee Moreno, ) 
) F I L E D 
Defendant and Appellant. ) (July 12, 1994) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Attorneys: Aric Cramer, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Joanne C. Slotnik, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. We vacate the order of the trial court and remand the 
case for entry of findings. 
In February 1992, defendant filed a motion to suppress 
certain evidence that was seized from his automobile in October 
1991. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued a 
minute entry denying thQ motion. Unfortunately, the trial court 
improperly failed to specify any basis for its denial of 
defendant's motion. See State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784 
n.26 (Utah App.) (requiring specific factual findings to support 
trial court's decision on motion to suppress), cert, denied, 817 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 n.l 
(Utah App. 1990) (same), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
While a warrant is generally required to search and seize 
evidence, there are exceptions to this general rule, including 
search incident to arrest, plain view, and the automobile 
exception. In the present case, however, there are no findings 
as to which, if any, of the exceptions the trial court relied 
upon in denying the motion. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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487-5971 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
vs. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CaseNo.9H901754FS 
JAMES LEE MORENO, 
Defendant. Judge James S. Sawaya 
Come Now John R. Bucher, attorney for the defendant above and submits the following 
objections to those certain Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the plaintiff in 
the above: 
1. The defendant objects to the finding that his vehicle was "sandwiched" by two police cars. 
No testimony exists to support said finding and the correct testimony is on page 9 of the transcript. 
2. The defendant objects to the statement in finding number 2 that officer Jackson had experience 
which led'him to believe the paper he saw in the vehicle of the defendant was cocaine. 
The Officer testified that he had been a narcotics officer for two years and that he has seen bindles 
folded the way the subject bindle was folded 
3. No conclusion of law was ever reached that the parking lot was "open to the public" 
and no evidence was ever presented in any form that the parking lot was open to the public. 
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Dated this 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing to Mr. flames Cope Esq^a-EJeputy District Attorney this 
18th day of February, 1995. 
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